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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary 
This case presents the issue whether the law allows a seller of real property subject to 
restrictive covenants to recover damages from its buyer resulting from the condemnation of those 
restrictive covenants by a subsequent public entity purchaser. 
The Harris Family Limited Partnership ("Harris") is the principal owner and developer of 
the Harris Ranch development in East Boise. Harris sold an approximately 44 acre parcel of 
land in Harris Ranch ("the Harris Ranch East Parcel") to Brighton Investments, LLC and a 
related entity ("Brighton") in December, 2005. The purchase agreement between the parties 
("Purchase Agreement") contained covenants relating to architectural and landscaping approval 
that ran with the land (the "Restrictive Covenants"), but contained no restriction concerning 
resale or conveyance. 
About the same time as the closing of the HarrisIBrighton sale, the Boise School District 
("the School District") and Boise State University ("BSU") formulated a plan by which BSU 
would purchase land in Harris Ranch that it would trade with the School District for the old East 
Junior High School campus which BSU wanted to develop as an athletic complex. When the 
School District told Harris it was looking for a site for a new East Junior High School, Harris 
offered to sell the School District a 20 acre parcel near the proposed Alta Harris Park ("the 
Harris School Parcel") for $5 Million. 
Discussions between i-Iarris, the School District and BSU concerning the Harris School 
Parcel proceeded until July, 2006 when Harris told the School District it would not sell the 
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property until the City of Boise approved the final Harris Ranch project. The apparent reason for 
the Iiarris refusal to sell at the time was a plan to leverage the School District into supporting the 
intended Harris development application with the City of Boise. 
The School District wanted the new East Junior High School built and operational by the 
Fall of 2008 and tried, until October, 2006, to convince Harris to let it purchase the Harris School 
Parcel right away. When it became clear, in October, 2006, that Harris wouldn't sell the 
property in time to meet the School District schedule, the School District and BSU started 
looking for other property in the Barber Valley. They soon found the parcel Brighton had 
bought from Harris in December, 2005 and offered to purchase 21.54 acres ("the School 
Parcel"). Brighton agreed. 
When Harris learned that the School District couldn't be leveraged into supporting its 
development application because BSU was obtaining property from Brighton, it asserted that 
pre-development architectural and landscape approval covenants in the Purchase Agreement 
restricted the School Parcel to residential use and prohibited conveyance of the property for use 
as a school. Undeterred, BSU and the School District bought the School Parcel from Brighton. 
When Harris refused to provide its architectural and landscape approval, the School District sued 
Harris to condemn the Restrictive Covenants. 
Having lost its School District leverage for the City of Boise project approval and lost the 
$5 Million sale of the Harris School Parcel, Harris filed a ihird party claim against Brighton in 
the condemnation action by which it sought to obtain damages from Brighton. Harris alleges 
that Brighton violated the Purchase Agreement and "defied the express terms of the Restrictive 
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Covenants" by conveying the School Parcel to BSU, which subsequently conveyed the property 
to the School District, "a party with the power of eminent domain". (Harris Brief, p. 5.) Harris 
further alleges Brighton's sale of the School Parcel to BSU unjustly enriched Brighton in the 
amount of $3,945,682.00. (Harris Brief, p. 26.) 
The Harris claims were properly dismissed pursuant to motions brought by Brighton 
under IRCP 12(b) and 56. 
B. Facts 
Brig-hton Purchased the Harris Ranch East Parcel 
Harris, Brighton and others were involved in the development of the 1,225 acre Harris 
Ranch Project located in Boise, Idaho. Brighton's involvement started in approximately 1998. 
(R. Exhibit 14,12;  Affidavit of Mildred H. Davis in Opposition to Brighton Investments, LLC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Davis Affidavit").) 
In the autumn of 2005, Harris representative Doug Fowler and Brighton member David 
Turnbull talked about Brighton purchasing property from Harris. One of the parcels they talked 
about consisted of approximately 44 acres and had been referred to as the "Golden Dawn Parcel" 
or "44 East of Golden Dawn." This parcel is identified in the Harris Brief as the "Harris Ranch 
East Parcel." (R. ~xh ib i t '  12,117 4-6; Affidavit of David W. Turnbull, filed June 13,2008 
("Turnbull Affidavit").) During the course of their discussions, Mr. Fowler told Mr. Turnbull 
about a potential sale of the Harris Ranch East Parcel for approximately $65,000.00 per acre. 
' Citations herein to "R. Exhibit -" refer to the numbered exhibits to the Record on Appeal listed on the District 
Court Clerk's "Certificate of Exhibits," R. Vol. 11, pp. 421-422A. 
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Mr. Turnbull indicated he thought the property was worth more. (Exhibit 12,7 6 ;  Turnbull 
Affidavit.) In follow-up, Mr. Fowler sent an e-mail to Mr. Turnbull on November 2,2005, by 
which Harris proposed to sell three parcels, including the "44 East of Golden Dawn" to Brighton 
"at market." 
After a meeting with Mr. Fowler to discuss the sale of the three parcels, Mr. Turnbull 
wrote his estimate of the "market value" of each of the parcels on his copy of Mr. Fowler's 
November 2,2005 e-mail. The market value he placed next to 44 East of Golden Dawn was 
$100,000.00 per acre or $4,400,000.00. (R. Exhibit 12,yI 9-10; Turnbull Affidavit.) 
Mr. Turnbull was willing, on November 2,2005, to pay $100,000.00 per acre for the Harris 
Ranch East Parcel and offered to pay that amount to Harris. (R. Exhibit 12,y 11; Turnbull 
Affidavit.) Harris elected to sell the parcels for $100,000.00 per acre and neither Harris nor 
Brighton asked for an appraisal of the property. (R. Exhibit 12,y 12; Turnbull Affidavit.) 
Brighton neither agreed to pay, nor received, a discounted price for its purchase of the Harris 
Ranch East Parcel. (R. Exhibit 12,77 26-27; Turnbull Affidavit.) 
As agreed, the Purchase Agreement contained provisions for pre-development "reciprocal 
design review and approval" in Section 7 which are entitled "Post-Closing Agreements" (the 
"Restrictive Covenants"). (R. Exhibit 12,7 24; Turnbull Affidavit.) The Restrictive Covenants 
provided Harris with some level of review and approval as to the architecture and landscaping on 
the Harris Ranch East Parcel. The Restrictive Covenants do not however, contain the words 
"residential use" or limit the use of the property to residential use. Specifically, the Restrictive 
Covenants required that Brighton submit "the final landscape plan, unrecorded restrictive 
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covenants and architectural guidelines" ("the Final Plans") to Harris prior to the develo~ment of 
the parcel which were to be "consistent with" standards which were not presented to the district 
court and are not in the record on appeal: 
The Final Plans shall provide for landscaping, architectural 
guidelines and restrictive covenants consistent with (i) the quality 
and common theme of the Spring Creek and/or Mill District 
developments in Harris Ranch; and (ii) the Existing Governmental 
Approvals ("Development Standards"). 
(R. Exhibit 12,725, Ex. 4 , 7  7.3; Turnbull Affidavit.) 
The Restrictive Covenants expressly benefitted property owned by Harris which was 
identified in the Purchase Agreement as "the Harris Property" and described on Exhibit C to the 
Purchase Agreement. (R. Exhibit 12,725, Ex. 4, Ex. C; Turnbull Affidavit.) The Harris 
Property was also identified in a Memorandum of Agreement filed with the Ada County 
Recorder to which the same legal description was aflached as Exhibit B. (R. Vol. I. p. 160; 
Memorandum of Agreement dated January 17,2006, Ex. B to Amended Answer, Counterclaim 
and Demand for Jury Trial Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 38(b) ("Amended Answer").) 
Harris contends, on pages 8 and 21 of its brief, that "all the adjacent properties which are 
or will be owned by Brighton andlor Harris andlor entities related to Brighton and/or Harris" 
were to be protected by the Restrictive Covenants. No such properties however, other than the 
"Harris Property", are described anywhere in the record. 
No value was attributed to the Restrictive Covenants by the Purchase Agreement or the 
Memorandum of Agreement. (R. Exhibit 12, 7 25, Ex. 4,777, I ,  7.4; Turnbull Affidavit; R. Vol. 
I, p. 160; Ex. "B" to Amended Answer.) Neither the Restrictive Covenants nor any other part of 
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the Purchase Agreement limited Brighton's right to sell or transfer the property to a third party, 
including a party with "the power of eminent domain". (R. Exhibit 12,725, Ex. 4; Turnbull 
Affidavit.) In fact, Section 15 of the Purchase Agreement and Section 2 of the Memorandum of 
Agreement intended the Restrictive Covenants to "run with the land" and contemplate the 
possibility of subsequent conveyance. Section 15 of the Purchase Agreement states: 
15. BINDING EFFECT. This Agreement shall be binding 
upon the successors and assigns of the parties hereto. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 147, Ex. "B" to Amended Answer.) 
Section 2 of the Memorandum of Agreement states: 
2. RECORDING. This Memorandum Agreement shall be 
recorded in the official records of the County of Ada, State of 
Idaho, shall run with the land, and shall inure to the benefit of and 
be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective successors, 
agents, designees, assigns and, if applicable, upon and to each 
party's respective partners, members, associates, and employees 
and their successors, agents, designees and assigns. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 163; Ex. " B  to Amended Answer.) 
Brighton's purchase of the Harris Ranch East Parcel closed on January 26,2006. The 
Memorandum of Agreement which contained and recited the Restrictive Covenants was 
executed by Harris and Brighton that day and recorded in the records of Ada County, Idaho, as 
Instrument No. 106012944 on January 26,2006. (R. VoI. I, p. 160.) 
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Harris Offers To Sell a 20 Acre School Site to BSU for $5 Million, but then Refuses 
to Sell the Parcel until after the Harris Ranch Projecf Receives 
All its Entitlements from the City of Boise 
On November 29,2005, shortly before the closing of the Harris/Brighton sale, Dr. Vickie 
Simmons, Deputy Superintendent of Schools for the School District, met with Harris 
representative Doug Fowler to discuss whether Harris owned a suitable, available spot for a 
junior high school in the Barber Valley. (Exhibit 1 I, tj 3, Ex. 2, Transcript of Proceedings pages 
29:8 through 30:20; Affidavit of David R. Lombardi, filed June 13,2008 ("Lombardi 
Affidavit").) A short time later, in January, 2006, the School District Board of Trustees 
approved a facilities master plan and a bond election to finance the construction of two new 
elementary schools, the reconstruction of several junior high schools, and the relocation of two 
junior high schools. East Junior High School was one of the new junior high schools planned for 
relocation. (R. Exhibit 1 I ,  tj 5, Ex. 4, Transcript of Proceedings pages 32:ll through 33:lO; 
Lombardi Affidavit.) 
The School District planned that construction of the new East Junior High School would 
start in March 2007 and that the school would be open for business in the fall of 2008. (R. 
Exhibit 11 ,16,  Ex. 5, Transcript of Proceedings pages 33: 11 through 34:8; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
At about the same time, BSU had plans to obtain the existing site of East Junior High 
School at the corner of Warm Springs and Broadway for an athletic facility. Consistent with 
these plans, the School District and BSU signed a letter of intent on January 13,2006, that 
contemplated BSU purchasing land in Harris Ranch or in the Barber Valley which it would 
exchange with the School District for the existing East Junior High School site. (R. Exhibit 11,tj 
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7, Ex. 6, Transcript of Proceedings page 3 1 :4 through 3 1 : 16; Lombardi Affidavit.) The idea 
behind the transaction was that the School District would build a new junior high school in 
Barber Valley and BSU would build a new athletic facility on the site of the former East Junior 
High School. (R. Exhibit 11,77, Ex. 6, Transcript of Proceedings page 3 1 : 16 through 3 1 :24; 
Lombardi Affidavit.) 
The School District bond election took place on March 14,2006 and was successful. (R. 
Exhibit 11,y 8, Ex. 7, Transcript of Proceedings page 35: 17 through 35:21; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
Following the successful bond election, several representatives from the School District 
met with Harris representative Doug Fowler to see a 20 acre parcel of property Harris offered to 
sell to the School District for the site of the new East Junior High School. (R. Exhibit 11,79, Ex, 
8, Transcript of Proceedings pages 35:22 through 38:23; Lombardi Affidavit.) This 20 acre 
parcel (the "Harris School Parcel") was bordered by an Idaho Power corridor and the proposed 
Alta Harris Park. (R. Exhibit 11,y 10, Ex. 9, Deposition of Vickie Simmons pages 2 1 :24 through 
23:13, Exhibit 30; Lombardi Affidavit.) The purchase price proposed for the 20 acre Harris 
School Parcel was $5 Million. (R. Exhibit 1 1,y 1 I, Ex. 10, Deposition of Vickie Simmons 
pages 83:7 through 85:12; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
Harris and the School District started discussions, including email exchanges, regarding a 
purchase agreement for the Harris School Parcel in June, 2006. (R. Exhibit 1 1,n 12, Ex. 1 1, 
Deposition of Gene Bleymaier, Exhibits 26 and 27; Lombardi Affidavit; see also R. Exhibit 11, T/ 
13, Ex. 12, Transcript of Proceedings pages 38:24 through 39:7; Lombardi Affidavit.) The 
discussions concerning the School District purchase of the Harris School Parcel did not, 
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however, last beyond July, 2006. Harris representative Doug Fowler "made it clear" at a 
meeting attended by representatives of BSU and the School District that month, that "Harris 
Ranch Limited Partnership would not actually convey or sell that property to Boise State until 
the entire Harris Ranch project had been approved by the City of Boise." (R. Exhibit 11,lI 14, 
Ex. 13, Transcript of Proceedings page 39% through 39:17; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
The School District tried, through October of 2006, to reach some kind of agreement with 
Harris that would allow conveyance of the land so the School District could start construction 
and meet its time schedule. Despite School District entreaties, Doug Fowler repeatedly 
reiterated, orally and in writing, that Harris would not transfer any property until it had received 
the approvals it wanted from the City of Boise. (R. Exhibit 11,vv 15 - 16, Exs. 14 -15, 
Transcript of Proceedings pages 40: 17 through 45: 16; Lombardi Affidavit; see also R. Exhibit 
I l , q  16. Ex. 15, Deposition of Vickie Simmons, Exhibit 36 and pages 57:20 through 59: 1; 
Lombardi Affidavit.) This position was repeated by Mr. Fowler in his October 18,2006 email to 
Vickie Simmons, in which he stated, "this is Harris Family Limited Partnership's reconfirmation 
that the approval of the project (in their discretion) is a condition of closing on the land that has 
been under discussion." Vickie Simmons replied to Mr. Fowler, stating: 
Thanks for your email regarding the reaffirmation of Harris Ranch 
Limited Partnershi0 to withhold conveyance of 20 acres for a new 
junior high until thk city approves the entire Harris Ranch project. 
Due to the uncertainly of the date for a transfer of the 20 acres to 
Boise State University, the Boise School District must pursue other 
property options for the construction of a new junior high. 
(R. Exhibit 11, 16, Ex. 15, Deposition of Vickie Simmons, Exhibit 36 and pages 57:20 through 
59: 1; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
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The School District and BSU Look for Alternatives to the Harris School Parcel 
The Harris refusal to commit to sell the Harris School Parcel created a significant 
problem for the School District, which decided to look for other Barber Valley sites. "Timing 
was important" and that the School District was unwilling to wait for Harris to obtain final 
approval because, among other things, it felt an "obligation to the voters", "construction costs 
had been going up astronomically", and "every delay was a costly one in terms of construction, 
architecture, all of that that was involved this project." (R. Exhibit 11,1120, Ex. 19, Deposition 
of Vickie Simmons pages 42:3 - 24; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
After negotiations with Harris had been exhausted, the School District contacted its 
broker, Mr. Ballantyne with Thornton Oliver Keller, and asked him to help them find another 
suitable site for East Junior High School in the Barber Valley. (R. Exhibit 11,T 17, Ex. 16, 
Transcript of Proceedings pages 45:20 through 46:2:12; Lombardi Affidavit.) A variety of sites, 
which ultimately included the School Parcel owned by Brighton, were identified and reviewed 
by the School District. (R. Exhibit 11,y 18, Ex. 17, Transcript of Proceedings pages 46:3 
through 47: 12; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
The Harris application to the City of Boise for the entitlements necessary to complete the 
development of Harris Ranch was submitted by Harris on December 22,2006. This application 
received final approval from the City of Boise effective December 17,2007. (R. Exhibit 1 1 ,y  
19, Ex. 18; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
The first contact with Brighton concerning the School Parcel was made by BSU and was 
initiated by Gene Bleymaier and BSU President Bob Kustra who met with David T m b u l l  in 
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October, 2006. (R. Exhibit 11,T 21, Ex. 20, Deposition of Gene Bleymaier pages 28:s through 
30:6; Lombardi Affidavit.) Mr. Bleymaier recalls that he and Mr. Turnbull discussed the terms 
of an agreement shortly thereafter on November 2,2006. (R. Exhibit 1 1,722,  Ex. 21, 
Deposition of Gene Bleymaier pages 30:20 through 33: 14; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
Mr. Bleymaier testified about his meetings with Mr. Tumbull and recalled that Mr. 
Turnbull repeatedly expressed his concern "that he did not want to be involved with this property 
and Boise StateIThe School District unless it was very clear on the School District side that they 
could not work out a deal with the Harrises." (R. Exhibit 11,723, Ex. 22, Deposition of Gene 
Bleymaier pages 33: 15 through 34: 14; Lombardi Affidavit.) As a result of this insistence by 
Mr. Turnbull, Mr. Bleymaier asked Vickie Simmons "to make sure" no timely deal could be had 
with Harris. Mr. Bleymaier testified about the meetings and Mr. Tumbull's concerns about 
Harris as follows: 
Q. Okay. And any other items or consideration or incidental 
matters discussed had as part of the deal, I'll call it, at this 
meeting? Like football tickets, recognition of any kind from Boise 
State's perspective? 
A. No, I don't recall that being a part of it. We do usually 
offer recognition, and I probably did offer to recognize Brighton 
and/or Mr. Turnbull in some form. I would add that during these 
three Meetings, that we had in a two-week period, that I think 
probably at every one of those meetings David was most 
concerned about the Harrises, as were we because of our 
relationship with the Harrises. And that he wanted to be sure that 
the School District had exhausted their pursuit of the Harris Ranch. 
And that he did not want to be involved with this property and 
Boise StateJthe School District unless it was very clear on the 
School District's side that they could not work a deal out with the 
Harrises. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11 
Q. Okay. And did -as a result of those statements made at - 
by Mr. Turnbull at each of those three meetings, did - was that 
statement made at each of those three meetings? 
A. As I mentioned, I believe so. 
Q. Did, as a result of that, someone, either you or Mr. 
Turnbull, go out and make sure that the School District had 
exhausted its discussions with the Harrises? 
A. Yes. I believe - I don't know whether Mr. Turnbull did, 
but I recall that I checked with Vickie Simmons to make sure. And 
my recollection is that that's when she told me that she had posed 
the question in writing to Doug and that she had received a 
response back in writing via email, is my understanding, from 
Doug which led them to conclude that they had exhausted every 
option. 
Q. They had exhausted every option, to put a little finer point 
on it now, to acquire the Harris parcel without attached as a 
condition city approval of the Harris Ranch master plan? 
A. I would word it differently. In their minds, they had 
exhausted every option with Harris Ranch to build East Junior 
High on that site. 
(R. Exhibit 1 I, 7 24, Ex. 23, Deposition of Gene Bleymaier pages 33:15 through 35%; Lombardi 
Affidavit.) 
After the meeting between Mr. Bleymaier and Mr. Turnbull on November 2,2006, 
Mr. Bleymaier discussed the general terms for a purchase of the School Parcel from Brighton 
with BSU President Bob Kustra and turned the matter over to legal counsel. (R. Exhibit 11,7 
26, Ex. 25, Deposition of Gene Bleymaier pages 36:I9 through 37:10; Lombardi Affidavit.) 
On November 27,2006, prior to the execution of the contract for the BSU purchase of the 
School Parcel from Brighton, David Turnbull sent an e-mail to Vickie Simmons in which he 
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advised her regarding the existence of the Restrictive Covenants. (R. Exhibit 1 1,127,  Ex. 26, 
Deposition of David Turnbull, Exhibit 8; Lombardi Affidavit.) Ms. Simmons testified at length 
during the hearing of July 23,2007 concerning extensive negotiations between the School 
District and Harris concerning waiver of the Restrictive Covenants which failed shortly before 
the School District Complaint was filed on May 21,2007. (TR: 53:13 - 72:13; R. Vol. I, p. 16.) 
Briahton Sells the School Parcel to BSU 
Notwithstanding and with full knowledge of the Restrictive Covenants on the part of 
BSU and the School District, BSU entered into a Contract of Sale and Real Estate Non-Cash 
Charitable Contribution Agreement on May 7,2007 by which it obtained the School Parcel from 
Brighton. (R. Exhibit 12 ,1  34, Exs. 6 and 7; Turnbull Affidavit.) Brighton agreed to sell the 
School Parcel to BSU for a cash price of $3.5 Million with any difference between the cash price 
and appraised value being treated as a charitable contribution. (R. Exhibit 12,T 34, Exs. 6 and 7; 
Turnbull Affidavit.) The sale transaction closed and a Deed of Gift conveying a 42.62% interest 
in the School Parcel and a Special Warranty Deed conveying a 57.38% interest in the School 
Parcel from Brighton to the State of Idaho, by and through the State Board of Education c/o 
Boise State University were recorded with the Ada County Recorder on May 7,2007. (R. 
Exhibit 12, 1 34, Exs. 8 and 9; Turnbull Affidavit.) 
While Brighton sold the School Parcel to BSU for a greater price than it had paid to 
Harris, the 16 month period from November, 2005 to May, 2007 was a time of significant price 
escalation in the Boise real estate market. (R. Exhibit 12 ,1  35; Turnbull Affidavit.) 
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BSU Trades the School Parcel for the School District 's East Junior Hirh Site 
And the School District Condemns the Restrictive Covenants 
In June 2007, BSU traded the School Parcel to the School District in exchange for the site 
of the existing East Junior IHigh School on the corner of Warm Springs and Broadway. Harris 
claimed the Restrictive Covenants were binding on the School District and precluded 
construction of East Junior High School on the School Parcel as proposed by the School District. 
C. Procedural History 
The School District initiated this lawsuit on May 21, 2007, to condemn the Restrictive 
Covenants and all rights to enforce them. (R. Vol. I, p. 16.) 
On July 20,2007, Harris brought Brighton into the condemnation lawsuit as a third party 
defendant alleging a number of theories that center on the contention that Brighton acted 
improperly by selling the School Parcel to BSU with the knowledge that the School District 
would condemn the Restrictive Covenants. (R. Vol. I, p. 76.) 
On July 25,2007, shortly after the Harris Third Party Complaint was filed, but before any 
appearance by Brighton, Harris stipulated to a quick take Order and Partial Judgment which held 
that "the subject restrictive covenants and the [Harris'] right to enforce same are hereby 
condemned and of no effect" ("the Quick Take Stipulation"). Harris also agreed that "the actual 
value of the property interest condemned will be determined at a later date pursuant to 3 7-721 
(4)(5)(6)(7) and (8)" (R. Vol. I, p. 171 .) 
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Brighton Prevails axainst Harris on Briahton 's 
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summarv Judgment 
On October 11,2007, Brighton filed a motion to dismiss Counts 1 (Breach o f  Contract - 
Termination o f  Agreement), 2 (Breach o f  Contract - Specific Performance), 3 (Breach o f  
Contract - Disgorgement o f  Profits from Breach), 4 (Breach o f  Contract - Implied Covenant o f  
Good Faith and Fair Dealing), 6 (Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Gain) and 
7 (Fraud) in the Harris AmendedISupplemental Third Party Complaint, which the district court 
granted on November 21,2007. (R. Vol. 11, p. 230A.) Subsequently, Harris filed its Amended 
and Restated Third Party Complaint to add an additional count against Brighton for unjust 
enrichment. (R. Vol. 11, p. 257.) 
Brighton filed a motion for summary judgment on June 13,2008, addressing the 
remaining Harris claims for breach of  fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. The district court 
granted Brighton summary judgment on August 29,2008. (R. Vol. 11, p. 393.) The dismissal of 
the Harris third party claims was not certified for immediate appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) 
and the condemnation case proceeded toward trial while Brighton waited for this appeal. 
Harris accepts $1 75.000.00 from the School District as Pavment 
For the Value ofthe Condemned Restrictive Covenants 
On March 18, 2009, Harris and the School District entered into a Mutual Release and 
Settlement Agreement whereby the School District agreed to pay, and Harris agreed to accept, 
$175,000.00 for the value o f  the condemned Restrictive Covenants in settlement o f  the School 
District's Complaint for Condemnation. (R. Vol. I., p. 16.) it is not clear, and Harris does not 
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explain, why it accepted $175,000.00 for the value of the Restrictive Covenants which it states, 
on pages 12 and 13 of its brief, were valued by Harris and its expert witness at $2,250,000.00. 
Harris describes this case as "a dispute between members of a limited liability company" 
in the first sentence of its Facts and Procedural History on page 7 of its brief. While it is true that 
Harris and Brighton were members of HarrisIBrighton, LLC, membership in HarrisIBrighton, 
LLC were material to only one of the ten counts contained in the Harris Second Amended and 
Restated Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. No issues concerning the limited 
liability company have been raised in this appeal. (R. Vol. 11. p. 257.) The dispute, as noted at 
the beginning of this section, concerns whether Brighton has liability to Harris because the 
School District condemned the Restrictive Covenants after it obtained the School Parcel from 
BSU. 
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Brighton restates the issues on appeal as follows: 
1 .  Did the district court err in granting Brighton's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(g)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure? 
2. Did the district court err in dismissing the Harris claim for unjust enrichment on 
summary judgment? 
3. Is Brighton entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Harris correctly states the law regarding the standard of review for an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss. The nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences drawn in its favor and 
it must "appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim 
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which would entitle the [plaintifq relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 
1346, 1347 (1992); see also Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102,104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 
(2002). 
Harris also correctly recites the law regarding the standard of review in connection with 
an I.R.C.P. 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. "Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."' Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 752, 133 P.2d 121 1, 1217 (2006) (citing 
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000)). 
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must, however, set forth "specific facts" 
showing there is a "genuine issue" about a "material fact." Tuttle v. Sudena Industries, Inc., 125 
Idaho 145, 150,868 P.2d 473,478 (1994); Garze v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334, 
337 (Ct. App. 1992). Indeed, a "nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory 
assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. A mere scintilla 
of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact for the purposes of summary judgment." Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,896, 
155 P.3d 695,697-98 (2007) (citing Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,238, I08 
P.3d 380,385 (2005)). 
These legal principles make it clear that conclusions that are unsupported by specific 
factual allegations will not survive a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(h)(6). They also make it 
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clear that conclusions with no support in the record will not survive a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Harris offers conclusions, but no relevant legal or factual support for its appeal. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Properly Dismissed the Claims for Breach of Contract. 
Harris contends that the district court order dismissing the Harris breach of contract 
claims "absolved Brighton of its earlier breaches of the Restrictive Covenants, and eliminated 
Harris's corresponding private contractual remedies under the Agreement." (Harris Brief, p. 13, 
emphasis added.) Harris mischaracterizes the district court's order which did not "absolve" 
Brigliton of any breach. It did no such thing because it properly dismissed the Harris breach of 
contract claims as groundless. 
1. Restrictive Covenants Which Hinder the Free Use of Land Must Be 
Clear and Express. 
Harris claims that the Purchase Agreement contained a restrictive covenant "to preserve 
the property for residential use" (Harris Brief, p. 18.) The express terms of the Purchase 
Agreement contain no such covenant. While restrictive covenants may be enforceable, Idaho law 
requires that they be clear and express: 
"Covenants restricting the free use of land are valid and 
enforceable in Idaho." Berezowski v. Schuman, 141 Idaho 532, 
535, 112 P.3d 820, 823 (2005). "However, since restrictive 
covenants are in derogation of the common law right to use land 
for all lawfhl purposes, the Court will not extend by implication 
any restriction not clearly expressed. Further, all doubts are to be 
resolved in favor of the free use of land." Id (citations omitted). 
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Birdwood Subdivision Homeowners 'Ass 'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 175 P.3d 
179 (2007). The Restrictive Covenants claimed by Harris do not satisfy this requirement. 
Since the Restrictive Covenants do not expressly restrict the use of the property to 
residential use, there was no breach. At a minimum, there was no breach while Brighton held 
title to the property. 
2. The Restrictive Covenants Did Not Expressly Limit the School Parcel 
to Residential Use or  Prohibit Conveyance to Anyone, Including a 
Buyer with the Power of Eminent Domain. 
The district court noted that neither the Purchase Agreement nor the Restrictive 
Covenants prohibited Brighton from selling the School Parcel to any party it chose and that 
lcnowledge of a likely breach in the future doesn't give rise to a cause of action, stating: 
Brighton surmised that the alleged breach of the Purchase 
Agreement was that it sold the property knowing it was likely the 
future site for a junior high school. The Court finds that 
knowledge of a likely breach in the future is not a breach that gives 
rise to a cause of action. Further, Brighton did not breach its 
contract because, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Court 
ordered that Harris Ranch no longer owns any right to enforce the 
restrictive covenants against the school site. Neither the Purchase 
Agreement nor its restrictive covenants limited Brighton's right to 
sell the land to a third party, including a party with condemnation 
authority. 
(R. Vol. 11, pp. 250C - 250D.) The district court was right because the residential use restriction 
Harris claims was contained in the Restrictive Covenants is not expressly stated, because 
Brighton fully complied with the Restrictive Covenants while it owned the School Parcel and 
because the breach, if any, occurred after it had conveyed all interest to BSU. 
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The Restrictive Covenants provided Harris with pre-development approval of the 
architecture and landscaping to be constructed on the I-Iarris Ranch East Parcel. The Restrictive 
Covenants also expressly benefitted specifically identified property owned by I-Ianis, and were 
intended to run with the land. 
Harris concedes, on pages 18 and 19 of its brief, that the Restrictive Covenants are 
contained in paragraph 7 of the Purchase Agreement. Harris then recites section 7.0 Post- 
Closing Agreements and section 7.3 of the Purchase Agreement which it mislabels as section 
7.2. Those provisions say nothing about residential use but refer to the "quality and common 
theme of the Spring Creek andlor Mill District developments in Harris Ranch," "Existing 
Governmental Approvals" and provide that neither party shall have the right to disapprove or 
request ~nodifications to the Final Plans if the Final Plans are consistent with the Development 
Standards, Initial Plans submitted pursuant to section 7.2 and Existing Governmental Approvals: 
7. POST-CLOSING AGREEMENTS. In order to protect and 
enhance the value of the Property and adjacent properties, which 
are or will be owned by Buyer andlor Seller andlor entities related 
to Buyer and/or Seller, the parties covenant and agree to comply 
with the following requirements from and after the Closing Date 
(collectively, "Post-Closing Obligations"): 
7.3 Prior to the development of the Property and/or the Harris 
Property, each party agrees to submit to the other party the final 
landscape plan, unrecorded restrictive covenants and architectural 
guidelines in connection with such party's property (the "Final 
Plans"). The Final Plans shall vrovide for landscapina 
architectural ~uidelines and restrictive covenants consistent with: 
(i) the auality and common theme of the Spring Creek and/or Mill 
District develooments in Harris Ranch: and (ii) the Existing 
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Governmental Approvals ("Development Standards"). The parties 
shall use all good faith efforts to work together and cooperate in 
reviewing, possibly modifying and approving the proposed Final 
Plans within two (2) weeks after the Final Plans have been 
delivered to the relevant party, which approval shall be signified in 
writing executed by both parties, and shall not to be unreasonably 
withheld, delayed or conditioned. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
neither party shall have the right to disapprove or request 
modification to the Final Plans if the Final Plans are consistent 
with: (i) the Development Standards; (ii) the initial Plans 
previously approved by such party; and (iii) the requirements of 
the Existing Governmental Approvals (as amended from time to 
time). (emphasis added.) 
(R. Vol. I, p. 185, 9 7; Ex. "A" to Amended Third Party Complaint.) 
The Restrictive Covenants do not, by the words used, limit the Harris Ranch East Parcel 
to residential use, but refer to documents, "quality," "common theme" and "Government 
Approvals" that were not presented to the district court and are not in the record on appeal. 
More importantly, neither the Restrictive Covenants nor any other part of the Purchase 
Agreement limited Brighton's right to sell the Harris Ranch East Parcel to a third party, 
including a party with the power of eminent domain. 
In fact, the Purchase Agreement and the Memorandum of Agreement each contemplate 
future sale, transfer or conveyance, by specific language binding "successors and assigns" in 
Section 15 of the Purchase Agreement and "successors, agents, designees, assigns" in Section 2 
of the Memorandum of Agreement. (R. Exhibit 12,7 25, Ex. 4 ,7  15; Tumbull Affidavit; R. Vol 
1, p. 163; Ex. "B" to Amended Answer.) 
Given the absence of express words limiting the use of the Harris Ranch East Parcel to 
residential use in the Restrictive Covenants and the clear anticipation that part or all of the 
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property might be sold, transferred or conveyed to "successors and assigns", the Harris 
contention that the Restrictive Covenants limited the use of the property to residential use is, at 
best, implied. Implied restrictions on the use of property are not enforceable under Idaho law. 
Birdwood Subdivision Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bulotti Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 175 P.3d 
179 (2007); Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189,923 P.2d 434 (1996). 
Brighton took no action that violated the Restrictive Covenants or any other terms of the 
Purchase Agreement. Brighton did nothing to restrict, nullify or modify the Restrictive 
Covenants. All Brighton did was sell the School Parcel to BSU. After taking title, BSU, like 
Brighton, had the right to develop the property subject to the Restrictive Covenants and to sell, 
transfer or trade the property. BSU ultimately chose to exchange the property with the School 
District, with the Restrictive Covenants intact, for the old East Junior High School property. 
After the School District obtained the School Parcel from BSU, Harris reksed to approve 
the School District's plans for construction of a school on the property and the School District 
elected to condemn the rights asserted by Harris under the Restrictive Covenants. Harris then 
stipulated to the taking at a "quick take" hearing on July 23,2007 under Idaho Code $ 7-721 and 
subsequently accepted $175,000.00 from the School District in settlement of its compensation 
claim. The Restrictive Covenants were unaffected by any conduct of Brighton, including the 
sale to BSU. 
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3. Restrictive Covenants that Run With the Land Do Not Create 
Liability for Former Owners. 
Covenants associated with real estate may be either personal or run with the land. If they 
are personal, they are enforceable only by the original parties to the agreement. If they run with 
the land, they are enforceable against successors-in-interest. See Sun Valley Centerfor the Arts 
and Humanities, Inc. v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 41 1,412,690 P.2d 346, 348 (1984) 
("covenants may be enforced by one other than a party to them where the original parties 
intended that the restriction should benefit the land of the person claiming the right of 
enforcement."). A successor to property subject to a covenant that runs with the land is, 
however, not liable for breaches that occur before or after he owned the property. Liability of an 
owner for breach of a covenant that runs with the land is, in other words, limited to liability for 
breaches of the covenant that occur during his ownership. See, e.g., Lesser v. Doughtie, 300 
Ga.App. 805,686 S.E.2d 416 (2009). 
In Lesser, Forest Creek entered into a development agreement with nearby landowners to 
develop its property in conformance with certain conditions. One of these conditions was a 
covenant that Forest Creek would install a six foot fence along its property line. Per the 
development agreement, the conditions were recorded as restrictive covenants on the property 
which were to be "binding on the successors, successors-in-title, legal representatives and 
assigns of Forest Creek . . . and [the landowners], respectively." Lesser, 300 Ga.App. at 810, 
686 S.E.2d at 418. 
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Forrest Creek sold the undeveloped property, subject to the restrictive covenants, to 
Crane and Duffey who in turn sold the undeveloped property to Bowmac. Bowmac developed 
the property but failed to build the fence in violation of the restrictive covenants. As a result, one 
of the adjacent landowners (Lesser) sued Doughtie (the president of Forrest Creek), Crane and 
Duffey, and Bowmac for breach of the restrictive covenants. 
The court ruled the owners of the property with title prior to Bowmac had no liability for 
Bowmac's breach because development of the property was a condition precedent to the titled 
property owner's obligation to build the fence. 
Lesser's claim did not accrue until the Property was being 
developed and the Agreement was breached. Bowmac, as a 
successor-in-interest to these appellees, held title to the Property 
during the course of its development. It follows that neither 
Doughtie, Crane, nor Duffey breached any duty to Lesser, 
they be held liable for any breach that occurred subsequent to their 
ownership of the Property. 
id at 810,686 S.E.2d at 41 8 (emphasis added). The court further emphasized that because the 
restrictive covenants were covenants intended to run with the land, Doughtie, Crane and Duffey 
could not be liable for a breach that occurred after they sold the property. 
The plain language of the recorded Agreement made clear that it 
was intended to relate directly to the Property and its development, 
as opposed to impose any personal obligation on any particular 
party. Its stated purpose was to further the planned development, 
and the fence commitment was given in exchange for the 
landowners' collective assurances that they would not in any way 
interfere with or impede that development. It unequivocally bound 
all "successors, successors-in-title, legal representatives and 
assigns," and affirmatively authorized the enforcement of its terms 
by the same. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the 
contracting parties did not intend to impose liability on these 
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former Property owners for a breach for which they otherwise were 
not responsible. 
Id. at 81 I, 686 S.E.2d at 422. 
Like the condition in Lesser, the Restrictive Covenants were not personal to Brighton, but 
were covenants intended, as expressed in the Memorandum Agreement, to run with the land. 
The Restrictive Covenants were, according to both the Purchase Agreement and the 
Memorandum of Agreement, binding on the successors and assigns to Harris and Brighton, and, 
in the case of the Memorandum of Agreement, specifically said they were to "run with the land". 
Further, the Restrictive Covenants specifically provided Harris with pre-development approval 
of the architecture and landscaping to be constructed on the Harris Ranch East Parcel, including 
review of "Final Plans." 
Brighton didn't develop the Harris Ranch East Parcel. Instead, like the owners prior to 
Bowmac in Lesser, Brighton sold the undeveloped property, subject to the Restrictive 
Covenants, to BSU. BSU in turn conveyed the property to the School District which 
condemned the Restrictive Covenants to commence development without approval by Harris. 
Even if the Restrictive Covenants restricted development of the School Parcel for use as East 
Junior High School, which is not supported by the language used by the parties, those Restrictive 
Covenants were never breached by Brighton. Any breach of the Restrictive Covenants that 
occurred arose as a result of School District conduct that was not subject to control by Brighton. 
Finally, as correctly noted by the district court, consistent with Lesser, supm, "knowledge of a 
likely breach in the future is not a breach that gives rise to a cause of action". 
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4. The Brighton Sale to BSU Was For a Clear Public Purpose Which 
Did Not Violate the Restrictive Covenants. 
Notwithstanding the absence of any breach of the Restrictive Covenants while title to the 
School Parcel was held by Brighton, and notwithstanding the absence of language in the 
Purchase Agreement or the Memorandum of Agreement prohibiting or limiting sale to a third 
party, Harris asserts Brighton breached the Restrictive Covenants by selling the School Parcel 
portion of the Harris Ranch East Parcel to BSU with knowledge 1) BSU might convey the 
property to the School District, and 2) the School District intended to build a school on the 
property. Harris relies on two cases in support of this argument, Thompson v. Squibb, 183 So. 2d 
30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) and Crayder v. Seidman, 87 Pa. D. & C. 118 (Pa:Com.PI. 1953). Neither 
case applies. 
The subdivision developer (Squibb) in Thompson v. Squibb, supra, sold lots subject to 
restrictive covenants that limited the lots to residential use. The defendant (Thompson) was 
involved in the development of an adjacent subdivision. Thompson purchased one of the Squibb 
lots and built a clay road across the purchased lot to create a connecting road between existing 
roads in the two subdivisions. When confronted with a claim that construction of the connecting 
road violated the restrictive covenants, Thompson argued that the connecting road did not violate 
the restrictive covenants because Florida law allowed restrictive covenants to be taken by 
eminent domain without compensation. Since a restrictive covenants could be taken for public 
use without the payment of compensation, Thompson argued, the "owner of such restricted land 
may make a voluntary conveyance or dedication of the land for a public use, such as a road or 
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highway, without liability for breach of the covenants." Thompson v. Squibb, 183 So. 2d at 33. 
The Florida district court of appeals noted that the connecting road had not been conveyed to a 
public body, rejected Thompson's argument and responded: 
We cannot follow this rationale. . . . There is not involved here an 
assertion by any public body of a right in the property involved. 
This is a controversy wholly between private parties. The Court, 
in the Bay Harbor case, pointed out that the Constitution and laws 
of this state are a part of every contract and that every person is 
charged with knowledge that any land may be taken by the 
sovereign for public purposes at any time. However, it would not 
necessarily follow that a landowner may voluntarily and without at 
least some substantial prospect that some public authority will 
exercise the power of eminent domain convey or dedicate his 
property for a use, public or private, which would violate his 
covenants. 
Id (emphasis added). 
Thompson v. Squibb is clearly distinguishable from this case. First, Brighton didn't build 
a clay road or a school or take any action subject to the Restrictive Covenants while it owned the 
property. Second, this case presents a clear public purpose (construction of a public school and 
collegiate athletic facility), actual conveyance of the property to a public body, and a clear 
prospect of condemnation in the absence of sale or other voluntary conveyance. At best, 
Thompson v. Squibb stands for the proposition that the "possibility" that a public body might 
condemn restrictive covenants for a use inconsistent with restrictive covenants does not excuse a 
property owner from honoring restrictive covenants and does not permit an owner to violate a 
restrictive covenant in furtherance of a sham public use. 
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Unlike Thompson v. Squibb, this case involves conveyance to a public body for a clear 
public purpose. Brighton did not convey or dedicate the School Parcel for a sham "public use" 
in violation of the Restrictive Covenants. Rather, Brighton sold the School Parcel to BSU which 
traded the property to the School District. Even if Brighton had conveyed the School Parcel 
directly to the School District, which it did not, and even if Brighton knew the School District 
intended to condemn the Restrictive Covenants in order to build a school, as Harris alleges, the 
transaction would still be permitted under Thompson v. Squibb. 
Crayder v. Seidman, cited by Harris, is similarly off point. In that case the defendants 
wanted to construct a road across restricted property to access five home sites they proposed to 
build on an adjacent lot. In an effort to avoid restrictive covenants that prohibited building 
anything other than a residential structure, the defendants dedicated their intended road across 
the restricted property to the City of Philadelphia which, they argued, extinguished the restrictive 
covenant because the City could exercise the power of eminent domain. Alerted by road 
construction on the restricted property, the adjoining property owners filed suit to enjoin 
construction and use of the road. Crayder v. Seidman, 87 Pa. D. & C. 11 8 (Pa:Com.PI. 1953). 
The court upheld the enforcement of the restrictive covenants notwithstanding the 
dedication to the City, noting: 
The fact that the city could have taken the property by eminent 
domain does not force a different result when a gift is made to the 
city, from that which results if the gift had been made to an 
individual. The position of the city is indistinguishable from that of 
any donee, it takes the gift cum onere. Thus, if the land were 
encumbered by a mortgage, no one would argue that by deed of 
gift to the city, the mortgage would be discharged. If the right of 
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plaintiffs is enforcible [sic] at all, it is enforcible [sic] against the 
world, subject only to the paramount right of the public to take 
after compensation for a public use. The act or motivation which is 
vitally different and distinct and which differentiates a gift by 
dedication to the city and a taking by eminent domain is that of 
initiation, i.e., in eminent domain proceedings the initiator is the 
public body. 
It is notable that the City of Philadelphia accepted the dedication of the road from the 
defendants but, once it was confronted with the action to enforce the restrictive covenants, took 
no action to condemn the restrictive covenants. Had the City of Philadelphia actually needed the 
dedication for a public purpose and exercised its power of eminent domain, the outcome would 
clearly have been different. 
This case is significantly different. In contrast to Crayder v. Seidman, it is undisputed in 
this case that the School Parcel was sold and conveyed subject to the Restrictive Covenants, that 
the intended use of the School Parcel is clearly public, that the School Parcel was received by the 
School District with the Restrictive Covenants intact, and, unlike the City of Philadelphia, the 
School District actually exercised its power of eminent domain. If anything, Crayder v. Seidman 
is supportive of Brighton's position and the district court decision. 
5. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith Does Not Prohibit the Sale of the 
School Parcel in the Absence of an Express Restraint on Alienation. 
Harris tries to elude the undisputed fact that neither the Purchase Agreement nor the 
Memorandum of Agreement contains any restriction on Brighton's right to sell or transfer the 
property by contending the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing prohibited Brighton 
from selling the property if Brighton knew a public body would ultimately condemn the 
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Restrictive Covenants. Harris provides no legal authority to support this argument. This 
argument is also expressly contrary to the decisions of this Court in Bushi v. Sage Health Care, 
PLLC, 146 Idaho 764,203 P.3d 694 (2009), Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483,927 P.2d 873, 
(1996) and Idaho First Natl. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,288, 824 P.2d 84 1,863 
(1991), that link the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the terms "agreed to by 
the parties." Bushi, 203 P.3d at 694,698. 
In addition to the requirement that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing be 
associated with the express terms of the agreement between the parties, the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing only "requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations 
imposed by their agreement." Independence Lead Mines Co. v. fIecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 
26-27, 137 P.3d 409,413-14 (2006) (emphasis added). 
Acceptance of the Harris claim that there was a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing not only requires the implication of a residential use restriction and 
restriction on alienation that does not exist in the terms of the Purchase Agreement, it also 
requires to Brighton to comply after it no longer owned the property. The Restrictive Covenants 
involving the Harris Ranch East Parcel were not personal contractual obligations on the part of 
Brighton, but were, pursuant to the express agreement of the parties in the Memorandum of 
Agreement, covenants that "ran with the land." As such, they were only enforceable against the 
owner of the property subject to the covenants. The School District ultimately became that 
owner. 
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Brighton satisfied its obligations under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
conveying the School Parcel with the Restrictive Covenants intact. 
6. Neither the Reservation in the Quick Take Stipulation nor the 
Constitution Preclude the Dismissal of the Harris Breach of Contract 
Claims. 
The district court ruled, in connection with Brighton's Motion to Dismiss, that "Harris no 
longer own(ed) any right to enforce the restrictive covenants against the school site" following 
the quick take. Harris, on the other hand, contends that the Quick Take Stipulation reserved the 
right to sue Brighton for breach of the Restrictive Covenants and that the district court erred and 
violated its constitutional rights by granting the Motion to Dismiss the breach of contract claims. 
This argument fails because no breach of contract had occurred before the time of the quick take 
and Harris had no interest in the Restrictive Covenants after the quick take on which it could 
base a claim, 
The authorities and analysis that precede this section of Brighton's brief demonstrate that 
further sale, transfer or conveyance of the School Parcel is consistent with and was contemplated 
by the Purchase Agreement and Memorandum of Agreement, that Brighton did nothing to impair 
or interfere with the Restrictive Covenant while it held title to the School Parcel, that the 
conveyance of the property for a clear public use is not actionable under even the authorities 
cited by Harris, that Brighton's conduct did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and that there was no breach of contract before the quick take. The only question 
that remains is whether Harris had any right to enforce the Restrictive Covenant for a breach 
which allegedly occurred after the quick take. 
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The School District took the School Parcel subject to the Restrictive Covenants and 
began this litigation by filing an action against Harris to condemn the Restrictive Covenants. 
The district court ordered, based on the Quick Take Stipulation, that "the subject restrictive 
covenants and [Harris'] right to enforce the same as the covenants apply to the School Site 
described in Exhibit A are hereby condemned and are no longer enforceable." (R. Vol. I, pp. 
171-72.) From and afler the entry of that order, Harris ceased to own any right to enforce the 
Restrictive Covenants against the School Parcel or against Brighton. See Coeur d'Alene 
Garbage Service v. City ofCoeur D'Alene, 114 Idaho 588,759 P.2d. 879 (1988) (holding 
contract rights are a property interest that can be condemned); see also Lesser, supra. By the 
plain language of the court's order, and operation of law, there are no contractual rights 
appurtenant to the School Parcel which survived the condemnation. 
After condemnation of restrictive covenants, the owners of the dominant estate (in this 
case, Harris) no longer enjoy or have the ability to enforce the condemned restrictive covenants. 
See Electro-Nucleonics, lnc. v. Wash. Subuvban Sanitary Comm., 3 15 Md. 361,374,554 A.2d 
804, 810 (1989) ("Acquisition of the servient estate by the sovereign is said to extinguish the 
covenant. At that time the servient estate is no longer burdened by a restriction purporting to 
prohibit use of the property for the public purpose, and the owners of dominant estates no longer 
enjoy, and no longer can enforce, the benefit of the restriction against the formerly servient 
estate."). 
By way of example, Leigh v. Village of Los Lunas, 137 N.M.  119, 108 P.3d 525 (2004), 
involved a case in which landowners (the Leighs) brought an inverse condemnation action 
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against the Village after it acquired a lot in the same subdivision and built a drainage pond in 
violation of the subdivision's restrictive covenants. The court determined that by taking property 
for eminent domain purposes the Village also took the rights of the owners of the dominant 
estates to enforce the restrictive covenants. By reason thereof "the Leighs' interest . . . was 
extinguished." Leigh, 137 N.M. at 125, 108 P.3d at 531. 
Harris similarly no longer owned any right to enforce the restrictive covenants against the 
School Parcel after the quick take because those rights were condemned and are now owned by 
the School District. 
I-larris settled its compensation claim with the School District for the payment of 
$1 75,000.00. Harris received just and full compensation for the Restrictive Covenants. No one 
interfered with Harris's constitutional right to contract - the School District lawfully condemned 
contractual rights owned by Harris and provided the constitutional and statutory measure of 
damages for the value of the property interest it lost. 
B. The District Court Property Granted Summary Judgment on the Harris 
Claim for Unjust Enrichment. 
Harris argues that it is entitled to bring an unjust enrichment claim against Brighton 
because it no longer owned any right to enforce the Restrictive Covenants following the quick 
take. As addressed above, Brighton fully complied with the Restrictive Covenants and the 
School District fully compensated Harris for the condemned Restrictive Covenants. Moreover, 
Harris fails to establish a prima facie case for unjust enrichment. 
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1. Harris Has Received an Adequate Remedy at Law. 
Unjust enrichment is a claim in equity, which courts will not consider "when an adequate 
legal remedy is available." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, inc , 138 
Idaho 487,492,65 P.3d 509,514 (2003). See also Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398,404- 
405, 690 P.2d 333,339-40 (1984) (The remedy at law "must be plain and adequate, or in other 
words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the 
remedy in equity."). 
Because Harris was entitled to receive and has actually already received an adequate 
remedy at law - payment of the value of the Restrictive Covenants - it cannot also seek the 
equitable relief of unjust enrichment. Harris accepted $175,000.00 in compensation for the 
condemned Restrictive Covenants from the School District. The law does not allow I-larris to 
receive relief under the doctrine of unjust enrichment & compensation for the value of the 
condemned restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Erwin v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 
213 Miss. 885, 58 So.2d 52 (1952) (holding the court had no jurisdiction in equity to grant an 
injunction where the complainant had the adequate remedy at law of receiving compensation for 
property taken under the City's eminent domain power); see also Bock v. Wesfar Energy, inc., 87 
P.3d 375, 2004 WL 794537 (Kan App. 2004) (holding "plaintiffs failed to establish that an 
action at law would not provide an adequate remedy" for property taken by an electric company 
where the plaintiffs "request for compensation is a clear indication that an adequate remedy at 
law exists through the recovery of money damages."). The Court should affirm the district 
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court's decision lo grant Brighton summary judgment because Harris had, and has actually 
received, an adequate remedy at law. 
2. There is No Issue of Material Fact As to Whether Brighton was 
Unjustly Enriched Because There is No Evidence Harris Conferred a 
Benefit on Brighton it Would Be Unjust for Brighton to Retain. 
Harris concludes, without explanation, that an issue of material fact precluded the entry 
of summary judgment against its unjust enrichment claim. The point Harris misses is that an 
issue of fact does not preclude summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to provide evidence in 
support of an essential element of its case. See Nelson v. City of Rupert, 128 Idaho 199,202,911 
P.2d 1 11 1, 1 1 14 (1996) ("Summary judgment dismissal of a claim is appropriate where the 
plaintiff fails to submit evidence to establish an essential element of the claim."). 
Idaho law clearly states that a "prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three 
elements: (I) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation 
by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that 
would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for 
the value thereof." Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (2007). 
While Harris states that Brighton sold the School Parcel for a profit, Harris provided no 
evidence that Harris conferred anv benefit upon Brighton that would be inequitable for Brighton 
to retain. The appreciation of real estate and its subsequent sale at a higher price sixteen months 
later is not inequitable. Harris could have obtained the same or similar profit had it sold the 
School Parcel to BSU or another party for a higher price. In fact, the record reveals that Harris 
could have obtained the same or a similar profit if it had not refused to sell the Harris School 
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Parcel for $5 Million to the School District in the time frame required to meet the School 
District's plans to open the new East Junior High in the fall of 2008. 
The law of unjust enrichment does not compensate a party who in hindsight regrets a 
purchase price. "The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not operate to rescue a party from the 
consequences of a bargain which turns out to be a bad one." George v. Tanner, 108 Idaho 40, 
43,696 P.2d 891,894 (1985); see also Cady v Bush, 283 Minn. 105, 110, 166 N.W.2d 358,362 
(1969) ("it must be kept in mind that thc principle of unjust enrichment should not be invoked 
merely because a party has made a bad bargain"). 
Harris now seeks equitable relief to get more money out of a real estate transaction that in 
hindsight it views as a bad deal. Yet, the Court cannot rewrite the terms of the Purchase 
Agreement which placed no limitation on Brighton's right to sell the land to a third party, 
including a party with the power of eminent domain. Under the Harris logic, Brighton would 
have a claim against Harris for unjust enrichment if it had held onto the School Parcel and sold it 
in today's market for a loss. Because Brighton did not breach the Purchase Agreement by selling 
the School Parcel to BSU, it follows that Brighton was not unjustly enriched by any profit it 
made from the sale. 
V. ATTORNEYS' PEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Brighton requests and is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 
40 and 41, Idaho Code $ 12-120(3) and the agreement of the parties. 
Section 9.4 of the Purchase Agreement provides (R. Vol. I, p. 189) for recovery by the 
prevailing party as follows: 
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9.4 In the event of any controversy, claim or action being filed 
or instituted between Buyer and Seller to enforce the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement arising from the breach of any 
provision hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive 
from the other party all costs, damages, and expenses, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs through all levels of action, 
incurred by the prevailing party. This Agreement shall not confer 
any rights or remedies upon any person other than the parties and 
their respective successors and assigns. 
The purchase and sale of the Harris Ranch East Parcel was also a "commercial 
transaction" for which the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3). Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60,205 P.3d 1196 (2009). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Brighton Investments, LLC respectfully requests this Court 
uphold the district court's decision and award Brighton its costs and attorneys' fees in regard to 
this appeal. 
DATED this 28'h day of January, 2010. fcl 
GIVENS PURSLE 1 LLP I 
By: 
David R. Lombardi 
Attorneys for Brighton Investments, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 28Ih day of January 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Richard H. Greener 
Frederic V. Shoemaker 
Jon T. Simmons 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A. 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900 
Boise, ID 83702 
David R. Lombardi 
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